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I. COMPARING WITH THE JAPANESE
When I came to this country in the early 1960s, I became fascinated by the literature on comparative
economic systems. So, I earned a degree in it. At that time the area of Soviet economy was new and a
number of universities had just started introducing it in the university curriculum. During that period,
efforts were undertaken to understand the characteristics of the Soviet economy and its colossal
management system. The results of those efforts appeared in books, research articles and congressional
reports. The fundamental question was: how well is the Soviet economy doing as compared to the U.S.?
The great attention given to comparing success indicators of the U.S. and Soviet economies during the
sixties could only point to the fear that a communist country might be outperforming a strong
capitalistic society. It was, therefore, reassuring to all believers in capitalism to discover reality:
productivity in the Soviet economy was much below that in the United States. Economists point out the
absence of the profit motive and individual ownership of productive assets as the reasons for the
marginal productivity of the Soviet industry and collective farms. Even introducing some incentives had
backfired. As it has been well documented in the Soviet economy literature, the wise Soviet factory
worker should not outperform the budget even if there is incentive to do so. The reason is quite simple:
the higher the performance this year, the higher the standard next year. And, by not achieving the higher
standards in the next period, the worker may be penalized by more than the bonus received in the
preceding period. Other dysfunctional consequences have also been documented. The Soviet economy
comparison is interesting because it reflects the very fact that long term planning does not necessarily
generate the incentives that will improve productivity. The literature on the subject is massive. (The
book of readings by Bornstein and Fusfeld has a number of outstanding articles reflecting some of these
views.) It is, therefore, important to establish the premise that long range planning by itself is not a
sufficient condition, either for promoting a high degree of operating efficiency, or for improving
productivity.
The 1980s seem to be the decade of another self-examination of the economies of the Western world.
This time the threat is from a country in which communism had failed. The 1980s is the decade of
comparing the Japanese economy with the American economy. It is the decade in which many of the
principles of modern management and of economic systems are being questioned. Unlike the case of the
Soviet union, the Japanese did not suppress information about the performance of their economy, and
they reach out to learn and exchange technological ideas with the west. As a result, success indicators of
Japanese companies and of the Japanese economy are not any less known than those of companies in
the United States. Success indicators of both countries can then be compared and evaluated. It is known,
for example, that the Japanese output of automobiles has exceeded the output of automobiles in the
U.S.: the Japanese production of cars has increased sixty percent between 1975 and 1980 to a record of
over 11 million vehicles a year, while the U.S. production was about eight million vehicles a year in
1980. Similarly, automation has been introduced at different rates in the two countries. In Japan, about
70 percent of the spot welding involved in the assembly of automobiles is performed by computer-
controlled robots. That number is claimed to be 97 percent for Nissan Corp. The result of this
automation is that employment in the auto industry has increased by only nine percent during the period
in which the production increased by 60 percent. The significant impact on productivity was noted. On
average auto production increased from 15 to 28 vehicles per worker per year during the period from
1970 to 1980. During the same period, the average number of vehicles per worker per year in the U.S.
increased from nine to twelve (James Cook, "A Tiger by the Tail," Forbes, April 13, 1981, p. 124). In
specific cases, the numbers are higher. For example, in its 1981 Annual Report, Toyo Kogyo (the
producer of Mazda) reported an average production of 45.7 vehicles per worker in 1981 (p. 16). This
productivity improvement is translated into a price advantage for the Japanese of at least $1,600 per car.
In October 1982, The Financial Times of Canada reported different types of statistics in which the
number of industrial robots were estimated to be 14,000 in Japan and only 250 in Canada. Once their
programs are debugged, these robots work efficiently, do not complain, do not ask for more wages, and
do not make as many mistakes as their human counterparts.
Comparison Between Japan and Canada
Productivity Measures
Japan Canada
1. Number of Industrial Robots 14,000 250
2. Research and Development as a % of GNP 2.5% 0.9%
3. Gross Fixed Capital Formation 30% 22%
4. Time needed to build a small car 31 hours 60 hours
5. Average time to replace equipment 3.5 yrs. 8 yrs.
6. 1981 average unemployment 2.2% 7.6%
7. 1981 Consumer Price Index 4.5% 12.5%
8. Growth in real GNP -- 1981 4.1% 3.1%
Source: Financial Times of Canada, October 18, 1982, p. 14
The information about Japanese companies is available for the purpose of critically evaluating their
success indicators. Thus, many scholars and interested economists are shifting attention from
examination of the quality of the information (as was the case in comparing with the Soviet Union) to
an examination of the causes of that enormous success. Why have the Japanese been so successful? It
would be unreasonable to suggest that their defeat in the war created the seeds of their industrial
success. Several other assertions have been made. We will let sociologists and others examine the
effects of the deep-rooted cultural heritage and work ethics that many talk about. In this paper, attention
is directed to a different direction.
As with any new phenomenon, different authors provide different diagnoses. In a Harvard Business
Review article (July-August, 1980), Hayes and Abernathy assert that failure to improve productivity in
the U.S. is due to focusing on short-run performance and financial controls. This focus is said to be
captured by several indicators, including:
1. the decline in R & D in the U.S.;
2. focusing on profit centers and profit measures to evaluate the performance of
decentralized operations;
3. hiring top executives from outside the company;
4. producing products for present, not future, markets; and
5. using resources in bidding up prices of shares through mergers instead of making
new investments.
In an earlier article, Banks and Wheelwright (Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1979) reported that
corporate executives devise certain cost cutting programs, including deferral of maintenance and capital
expenditures in order to meet the "constant pressure to produce ever-increasing annual profits regardless
of long term strategies implications" (p. 113). They labeled this behavior as trading tomorrow's growth
for today's profits. In a third article, Wheelwright further argues that "making strategic long term
decisions runs against management's inability or willingness to make costly, short term decisions whose
benefits, if any, do not show up in current earnings reports." (Harvard Business Review, July-August,
1981, p. 68).
Moving from strategic and operational analysis to the human organization, Ouchi (1981) describes the
behavior of the American manager as being constrained by two dilemmas (p. 184):
1. The inability to cultivate trust and long-term human relations within the organization, and
2. Focusing on short term profits instead of encouraging long term productivity.
Illustrations are provided by cases in which the introduction of the Japanese management system to the
American factory was successful. Wheelwright reported that Motorola, now a division of Mitsushita,
increased productivity by 30 percent three years after being acquired. Motorola's assembly plant is
located in Illinois (p. 67).
The thrust of Ouchi's comments were seconded by Morita, the founder of Sony Corporation (New York
Times Magazine, January 4, 1981). He noted: "the trouble with a large segment of American
management is attributable to two misguided attitudes: American managers are too worried about short-
term profits and are too little concerned about their workers." (p. 17). In addition, "most corporate
managers in the United States are now oriented to short-term profit, which tends to discourage them
from making important investments in new plants, equipment and research development." (p. 42).
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING
So, what does all this mean to accounting? What does it imply that corporate executives focus on short
term profits? In this paper, we address the interface between some aspects of financial reporting
practices and the behavior of focusing on short run profits. Possibilities can be raised in three areas:
(Item 1) The extent to which corporate executives influence the formation of accounting policies.
(Item 2) The discretionary power held by corporate managements for selecting accounting
principles and methods.
(Item 3) The failure of accounting standards to incorporate the impact of technological advances
for the purpose of long run analysis.
1. Influencing Accounting Policies
Consider first the FASB Statement No. 8. Corporate executives in the U.S. were very critical of that
foreign currency translation standard, and mainly after it became effective. Similar reasons were
reported in every popular financial journal. An interesting article was reported by the New York Times
on December 8, 1976. The essence of that article and others like it is contained in a Forbes article
(October 13, 1980, p. 192) which reads as follows:
"The rule created huge earnings swings in virtually any firm that did
substantial overseas business. Worse, these swings had little to do with how
well the overseas subsidiaries were really doing."
In many ways, corporate executives and financial analysts complained: Predicting corporate earnings
became more difficult because of the volatility introduced by the effects of the translation of financial
statements of foreign subsidiaries on income. Their concern was manifested in undertaking two types of
activities:
(a) modifying their approach to managing foreign currencies and foreign operations as
reported by Evans, Folks and Jilling (1978); and
(b) pressing the FASB to change the standard.
These actions continued even after the financial press had labeled, properly so, the translations gain or
loss as "paper profits." But as long as the gain or loss impacts reported income, the best available option
was to change the standard. After a long wait, their wish was granted. In 1980, the FASB issued
Statement No. 52 superseding Statement No. 8. The statement introduced some innovations: a concept
of functional currency and sheltering the measurement of income from the gain or loss of translations.
Since the new standard requires by-passing the income statement by directing the translation gain or
loss to an equity account on the balance sheet, one would have thought that corporate managers got
their wish. No, not quite! Many executives were rather unhappy because Statement No. 8 was being
replaced at a time when the old and condemned statement was beneficial: Please note that short term
profits were enhanced by "gains" from currency translations using the method of Statement No. 8. In a
period when the U.S. dollar is strong overseas, applying FASB Statement No. 8 turned out to be
advantageous for the more multinational companies. And, those who cursed it when the dollar was
weak, loved it when the dollar was strong. In some respects, this is an implementation of one point of
view of the criterion of "relevance." That is, take it when it helps short term profits, but have it changed
when it does not. Consequently, not very many companies are rushing to adopt Statement No. 52 earlier
than they have to. By one estimate (Forbes, May 24, 1982, p. 86) about one half of the Forbes 500s will
wait as long as possible.
The story gets a bit nasty when FASB Statement No. 19 is remembered. Having inherited the problem
from the APB, and being pressured to act by the SEC, the FASB moved slowly, through the now
familiar due process, to develop a standard for oil and gas accounting. At the end of the process the
successful efforts method was voted in, and the full costing method was voted out. Unfortunately, that
was not for long. The oil and gas companies that followed the full costing method declared an
"accounting" war. The FASB was told the method is "not relevant" to the interests of managements of
those companies. The reason for the alleged lack of relevance must be noted: the successful efforts
method induces volatility in reported earnings. Many of the smaller oil companies threatened to
substantially reduce exploration efforts in order to avoid the swings in earnings if the standard was to go
into effect. The threat was made at a time when regulators wanted to hear the opposite. The lobbying
efforts intensified, the SEC gave in to the pressure, and the FASB was asked to rescind the standard.
The unpleasant story of accounting for investment tax credit of the early 1960s was once again repeated.
Why? Because of the impact on short-term profits.
The SEC created its own alternative, the reserve recognition accounting (RRA). According to the
method, reserves in the ground were to be estimated by specialized engineers and, by some arbitrary
means of transformation, a dollar number would be assigned to them. The RRA method was also
resented for nothing but the same reasons for which FASB 19 was rejected; namely, inducing volatility
in earnings. To this concern of the impact of RRA, Clarence Sampson, the chief accountant of the SEC,
was quoted as saying: "Businessmen get very upset when they see volatility in earnings. But from a
regulator's point of view, they should show volatility when there is volatility" (Forbes, September 29,
1980, p. 133). As much as the RRA method was disliked, companies complied with it but asserted that
the numbers "are meaningless and misleading." But the experiment did not last long; many managers
and analysts saw it as irrelevant to their needs. Once again the criterion of relevance has been given a
new twist.
The problem is not new. Admittedly these are the ones about which large battles were fought, but they
serve to highlight the strong influence that corporate executives exert on accounting policy in order to
get away from accounting standards that do not reflect well on their short-term profits. Thus, the focus
on short-run profits is coupled with this managerial disease that is called "earnings volatility." It is not
clear to me why accounting standards are fought if, as Sampson indicated, they show volatility when
there is volatility. The three cases cited above (the accounting for investment tax credit, the accounting
for translation gain or loss, and accounting for oil and gas), indicate some of the dysfunctional
consequences for accounting policy making that result from focusing on short-term profits by corporate
executives. It appears that these dysfunctional consequences are strengthened by the interaction of two
accounting objectives:
1. the primary focus of financial reporting is information about earnings and its
components (FASB Concepts Statement No. 1), and
2. the relevance of information to users is the primary qualitative criterion in financial
reporting (FASB Concepts Statement No. 2).
Given these qualities, an accounting standard is fought if it becomes inconsistent with achieving the
short-run profits to which managers aspire. The method of attack is simple: the standards that induce
volatility in earnings, or that would undermine profits in the near term are considered not "relevant."
Such behavior is consistent with the self-interest hypothesis advocated by others (e.g., Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979), and the hypothesis that setting accounting standards is a political process (e.g.,
Solomons, 1976).
Managers' concern for volatility of earnings is not a new hypothesis; it underlies the research on income
smoothing that was initiated by Gordon as far back as 1964. According to that hypothesis, managers see
their rewards to be inversely related to the variability of reported income. Although researchers have not
succeeded in directly evaluating the income smoothing phenomenon, specific cases do support it. A
good summary of this research is reported by Ronen and Sadan (1981).
The discussion here would be incomplete without a mention of FASB Statement No. 2, Accounting for
R & D. In essence, the standard might be accused of inducing earnings volatility if companies do not
alter their R & D activities because of the change of policy to expense all R & D expenditures as
incurred. The research on this subject is inconclusive. In a recent paper (1980), Horwitz and Kolodny
concluded that small high technology firms were adversely affected by the R & D standard. Wolfson
(1980) questioned the validity of that conclusion in view of the research method used, and in view of
the findings reported by Dukes, Dyckman and Elliott (1980). Given the history with FASB Statement
No. 8 and Statement No. 19, it is somewhat surprising that managements did not lobby to change
Statement No. 2. There are several hypotheses that one can generate to explain this phenomenon. First,
Statement No. 2 was issued in 1974, a period in which national expenditures on R & D were starting to
decline. Second, being the second statement by the FASB, there was not enough time for the lobbying
machinery to quite understand the operations of the new system and to develop a method of attack.
Third, the conceptual framework was not formulated and the "user primacy" criterion was not engraved
in official documents. Fourth, companies that were heavy in R & D continued to undertake R & D
activities and found contractual arrangements that are satisfactory from the viewpoint of the effect on
income. Finally, companies were given a bit of leeway as to classification of R & D into "basic" R & D
or engineering development.
2. Selective Choice of Accounting Policies
One of the other problems we have in our profession is the absence of a reasonable specification of the
conditions under which accounting principles and methods can be changed. Corporate managers
continue to hold a strong discretionary authority over those choices. And, given their orientation for
short-term profits, the discretion is often applied more selectively than can be justified by any theory of
income determination. My first case is the choice of the measurement of cost of capacity utilization.
Although the problems with the measurement of the cost of using fixed assets is a favorite example of
Art Thomas and Bob Sterling, I do not think I will sound like them. The measurement of depreciation
has always been as arbitrary as anything in accounting; in fact, Thomas and others do not call it a
measurement. It is an allocation of a number. The problems of measuring the cost of using capacity is
even more complicated by the flexibility of the choices allowed. Managers have the authority to
determine: (a) the useful lives of assets; (b) the arbitrary method by which the assets will be consumed;
(c) the salvage value of the asset, and (d) the changes in any of the above. This latter point is what
concerns me here. The changes in depreciation (both the timing of making the change and the amounts)
are often dictated by things other than the rate of capacity utilization. It is a viable hypothesis to assert
that accounting changes, in general, and changes of depreciation, in particular, are motivated by the
desire of corporate management to influence near term profits. To avoid being misunderstood, I believe
that APB Opinion No. 20 came a long way in requiring disclosures of these changes. But the disclosure
of actions is not enough. Accountants have been given the social role of income determination.
Accounting policies should not abandon that responsibility by permitting accounting changes that are
motivated by anything other than providing a better measurement of income or evaluation of
performance.
To illustrate the dilemma, consider the recent changes made by Union Carbide, a financially healthy
company which, in 1980, extended the estimated productive lives of machinery and equipment by more
than two years. A short period? Yes, but the impact on net income after tax in 1980 was $94 million. I
presume that an approximately equal amount was incorporated in the 1981 net income. In addition, the
company changed the method of accounting for investment tax credit from deferral to flow through.
The impact was $24 million dollars added to net income from continuing operations after tax, and $217
million in cumulative effect. After making some simple calculations, it appeared to me, without these
changes the reported EPS for 1980 and 1981 would have been flat. Not knowing the inside story or the
motivation for making these discretionary accounting changes, I could only hypothesize that these
changes were made in order to boost near term reported accounting earnings. This is particularly
important in view of the statement made by the company's management: "These changes do not affect
income tax payments or cash flow." (Union Carbide, 1981 Annual Report, p. 21).
I do not want to be misunderstood, Union Carbide has one of the better annual reports I have seen. I
could have picked any other company that made similar accounting changes. The point being made is
simple: discretionary nature of managerial choice of accounting methods; the particular company used
for illustration is not of any consequence. The same question can be raised of others. In 1981, Chrysler,
Burlington Industries, and McGraw-Edison switched from accelerated to straight line depreciation
methods for accounting. And, it is not all too recent. In 1975, for example, American Airlines extended
the useful lives of its airplanes for the purpose of income determination. According to one report (Jane
Carmichael, "The Wild Blue Yonder," in Forbes, November 9, 1981, p. 94), "Without that little
windfall, American's 1975 loss would have been $1.11 a share, instead of the 72 cents it reported."
Another case is the accounting change made by ABC in 1980. The percentage of the cost of a new show
that is charged off the first time it is broadcast was changed from 80% to 76%. The effect of net income
after taxes was substantial (Thomas Baker, "A Question of Judgment," Forbes, February 16, 1981, p.
52.)
Relevant questions need to be answered:
Do these or similar types of accounting changes better assist investors and creditors in predicting future
cash flows as to amounts, timing, and uncertainty?
Do these types of changes assist investors and creditors in better evaluating the performance of
corporate managements?
If not, why permit them?
As far as I can tell, both as a professor of accounting and as a potential user of financial statements, the
objectives of financial statements are not known to be better served by any of these types of accounting
changes. I will set aside for the moment my own biases against the implementation of the criterion of
"relevance," but I cannot set aside my biases against managers' obsession with short run profits.
Accounting ought not to be abused in order to satisfy that desire. The preoccupation with short term
profits is often asserted as the reason for the refusal of many companies to switch to LIFO given that
managers know the result will be a reduction in accounting earnings. The unconditional gift from Uncle
Sam that would accrue as a real reduction in the tax burden is often not seen fit to justify the
externalities associated with reporting lower accounting earnings. Never mind that the financial press
sometimes refer to it as "paper profits" as it did with respect to the foreign currency translation gain or
loss. Similarly, questions are still being asked: "Why did Chrysler change from LIFO in 1970 and incur
an additional tax payment of over $50 million? There can be little, if any, long term consideration for
making a decision of that type.
The morale of these stories is simple. As long as corporate executives are given a wide discretion for
making choices of accounting policies and principles, managers' concern for short term will be the
dominant criterion for making these choices. The chosen alternatives will often be those reflecting
favorably on short run profits. It is not difficult to assert that accounting policy makers have given
corporate managements an easy way to manage their short-term profits.
Ignoring Technological Advances
The third possible way in which accounting plays a role in this phenomenon of focusing on the short
term is the manner in which financial reporting ignores the effects of technological changes. In this
respect, the current cost approach adopted by the FASB in Statement No. 33 is inadequate. To explain
the problem let us consider the sources of difference between income determination under current cost
and historical cost. Under the current cost system of Statement No. 33, depreciation is the major source
of the difference between current cost net income and historical cost net income. To illustrate, consider
the following cases of three companies:
(CC-HC) in 1981 Fiscal Year Kroger Co. LTV Corp. Union Carbide
Difference in C.G.C. $ 6 mm $14.8 mm $ 69 mm
Difference in Depreciation $47 mm $90 mm $200 mm
These examples are provided to illustrate a point: When companies use historical cost to estimate the
cost of using capacity, depreciation is likely to be understated. A corresponding overstatement of
accounting income results. Thus, executives who are interested in short-term profits should always
prefer to use lower charges for the cost of capacity in the short run. Thus, the incentive for renovating
capacity and charging the higher cost of using capacity against income becomes more constrained. The
resulting rate at which equipment is replaced is slow. According to the Financial Times of Canada, the
average time to replace equipment in Japan is about 3.5 years, compared with about 8 years in Canada.
And, as stated elsewhere, the average age of GM's assembly plants as of 1980 was 39 years (Sloan and
Miles, "GM's Chance of a Lifetime?" Forbes, September 1, 1980, p. 110).
Although we cannot claim that charging depreciation at historical cost was the reason for delaying
replacement, the use of historical cost as a basis for measuring the cost of capacity utilization has indeed
sheltered that information from users. It is even more dangerous when historical cost depreciation
becomes a guideline for long term policy. Consider, for example, the policy that DeLorean instituted
while heading up the Chevrolet division of GM: "Capital expenditures should not exceed 90 percent of
depreciation." (Wright, 1979, p. 120). The reason provided was straightforward: "Cutting capital
budgets would force managers to use their facilities more efficiently. The figure of 90 percent was an
arbitrary figure selected as a target to bring discipline to our expenditures." (p. 12).
At the heart of the matter, however, is the absence of reflecting technological changes and, hence,
obsolescence in the measurement of income. Statement No. 33 (1979) did not provide an adequate
response to this need. For one thing, the FASB has opted for using current cost instead of current
replacement cost. As defined by the FASB,
The current cost of property, plant and equipment is the current cost of providing the same
service potential as embodied by the asset owned (Statement No, 33, p. 19).
(Current replacement cost is) the amount that would have to be paid to acquire currently the
best asset available to undertake the function of the asset owned. This concept of
replacement cost should be distinguished from the cost of replacing the service potential of
the asset owned, called "current cost." (Statement No. 33, p. 48).
Given this distinction between current cost and current replacement cost, the information required by
FASB Statement No. 33 does not include enough disclosure about management's performance in face of
technological advances. The user does not have a way of assessing the wisdom of management's
decision to keep or abandon old technology. I realize that Revsine (1979) argues that under certain
assumptions current cost (defined as deprival value) and current replacement cost would have the same
information content. The problem with Revsine's analysis is the set of restrictive assumptions imposed.
In particular, he assumed that technological advances are limited to those resulting in variable (or
operating) cost savings, old and new assets are perfectly divisible and no barriers to entry. Capital
savings and quality improvements are ignored.
Finally, we have seen how the Japanese succeeded in uniquely substituting robots for human labor.
Without including effects of technological advances, it would not be feasible for users to judge the
quality of management's performance vis-a-vis those issues. The investor did not know for a long time
that GM did not abandon old plants when it should; the information was not there.
An additional reason for confounding the problem is the extension of the same depreciation methods,
productive lives and salvage values from historical cost to current cost. Those extensions succeed only
in carrying the ambiguity associated with depreciation charges over to the measurement of the current
cost of using capacity. But that is not all. The possible effects of technological advances on shortening
the productive lives of existing assets are ignored.
Finally, operating expenses are not required to be adjusted for current cost. If in fact the productive
assets are subject to a high degree of obsolescence, then the newer technology will not only result in a
different current cost of replacement, but will also affect the operating efficiency of the would be
replacement (Lemke, 1976). If you were to use the replacement cost of your car in valuing it, you
should also adjust operating expenses for the added fuel efficiency and durability. Statement No. 33 did
not require making these adjustments.
These three reasons are hypothesized to be some of the causes contributing to the perceived lack of
usefulness of the current cost information required by FASB Statement No. 33. In this regard, I find
myself agreeing with the point made by Walters in his dissent to Statement No. 33. He says:
The current cost information introduced in this Statement has significant limitations. It is
neither a comprehensive current cost nor a value system. (Statement No. 33, 1979, p. 28).
III. BACK TO THE JAPANESE
Do the Japanese financial reporting standards permit focusing on long-term any more than the U.S.
standards?
From my readings and my evaluation of a few (translated) annual reports of Japanese companies, it is
not clear to me that the Japanese accounting directs attention to the long run any more than other
accounting systems. The profile of financial controls and planning provided by Pascale and Athos
(1981) for the Matsushita Corporation indicates a heavy emphasis on the six months, not the two or
five-year plans. Similarly, monthly reports of divisional performance and tedious monthly analysis of
variances from the six months budget are highlighted. Furthermore, Matsushita is said to be "bottom
line" oriented. Although the Japanese use that information internally and there are no public quarterly
reports to the stock market, it is difficult to claim that Japanese forego short run measures and
evaluation of performance. This is where one would start to question the diagnosis made by Hayes,
Abernathy and Wheelwright. Focusing on financial controls is not unique to U.S. companies; the
problem may be in the ways in which the success indicators provided by these controls are used. It is
reported (Forbes, September 1, 1981, pp. 110-111), for example, that GM's management did not
abandon old plants for new ones because of insisting on a five year payback period. The fact that GM
rejected a seven-year payback period (lower ROI) does not render the technique problematic.
Although I believe we can learn some lessons from the Japanese, the present preoccupation with
comparing their success with that of the U.S. companies is only a fad, not any different from the earlier
comparisons with the Soviet economy to which I referred earlier.
In my view, much of the diagnosis of the causes for the success of the Japanese will provide only
partial answers. The success of Japanese companies is due to multiplicity of factors and it would be
naive to attribute that success to focusing on long run and ignoring short-term profits and various
measures of financial controls.
To appreciate this point, it would be sufficient to consider the factors related to the system of industrial
organizations. Their industrial organization structure does not permit the management to emphasize the
short run at the expense of the long run. I would like to view with you some of the elements of that
structure as I see them:
(A) The following statement is printed in an attachment to the 1981 Annual Report of the Mitsubishi
Trust and Banking Corporation:
As of March 31, 1981, Mitsubishi Trust employed 5,921 persons in its operations. Of these
employees, 3,161 were men and 2,760 were women... The Bank assumes that male
employees, in particular, will spend their entire career with Mitsubishi Trust after
graduating from university or high school. In recognition of this strong personal
commitment, the Bank's philosophy emphasizes career-long, on-the-job training.... Periodic
job rotation is regarded as a key element in pursuing a career with the Bank. (p. 23).
By contrast, American companies do hire top executives from outside as well as from inside. Job
turnover in the U.S. is significantly higher and executives do not normally expect to stay with the
organizations in which they started their careers. Changing jobs and improving individual's careers
depends on his or her performance. Improving the income reported by an operating unit during his or
her tenure in office is a key component of that performance. Thus, many executives would have to
generate loyalty to their own careers, not to their companies. The long term success of their companies
may not enter in their equation of achieving good performance. They can always use the improved short
run profit in their current operation to move to another company. The setting is different.
(B) Japanese banks have a great deal of control over industrial companies. By examining the annual
reports of two banks (Mitsubishi Trust and The Tokai Bank), I became more convinced of the
usefulness of their power. For one thing, the Mitsubishi Trust and Bank, for example, is one of 28
Mitsubishi companies, called the Group. It is also affiliated with other companies outside the group.
The Mitsubishi Group produces steel, autos, cement, electronics and all kinds of things. "The Group
does not exist as a formal organization, but is a loosely-knit, informal relationship between companies
based on mutual cooperation." (The supplement to 1981 Annual Report, p. 6). "The shareholders of
Mitsubishi Trust include the larger companies affiliated with the Group, as well as many companies
affiliated with other groups.... Since no shareholder has as much as 7 percent of the Bank's stock, no one
shareholder or group exerts significant influence on the management of Mitsubishi Trust." (p. 7).
However, the report claims that the shares are freely traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Given this
loosely tied organization, many of the shareholders of each company in the group are not individuals
who would speculate in trading Mitsubishi shares. Furthermore, no one company in the Group has
incentive to play the stock market game by managing its earnings for those small investors since much
of the shares are owned by other members of the Group. Finally, Mitsubishi Trust does not only
perform banking services, but also invests in corporate stocks and bonds, performs services of
underwriting and investment banking, and provides a significant source of funding for the operations of
other companies. To illustrate the extent to which banks do have interest in the industrial companies
they finance, consider the following ratios for Toyo Kogyo and NEC: The current ratio is close to one.
The ratio of total liabilities to owners equity is between 4.0 and 5.0. The ratio of current liabilities to
owners equity is over three. It looks like all current assets are financed by short-term borrowing. The
financial statements of the Mitsubishi Trust and Bank refer to financing "long term working capital"
among many other long term projects.
These ratios clearly show that bank loans and short term credit are major sources of funding of those
two companies. They are highly levered but they will not go bankrupt because banks and other
companies of the Group will see to it that every company in the Group manages for long term. As Peter
Drucker reports, if a bank calls back one yen, it is a signal: the management must resign, or the
company must merge with another company.
(C) The power of the banks in managing the affairs of their clients is more than we know. Please
carefully evaluate the following quote from the 1981 Annual Report of the Nippon Electric Company:
Certain of the loan agreements provide, among other things, that the com-pany submits to
the lenders (upon their request) for approval, its proposed appropriation of income
(including dividends) before such appropriation can be submitted to the shareholders for
approval. (p. 42)
This is an extremely powerful control tool: control by veto; control by authorization of plans even
before ever being considered by the stockholders.
(D) By comparison to Western managers (according to a speech delivered at The University of Alberta
in November, 1982 by R. Ballon, an authority on Japanese management), the Japanese take longer time
to make decisions, but do take much shorter time to execute them. This view can be gleaned from the
Annual Report of Toyo Kogyo (the producer of Mazda):
Three critical areas which Toyo Kogyo must address. First, we must have the ability to read
and foresee the exact needs of consumers ahead of time. Second, we must be ready to
translate in the shortest possible time such research into technically sophisticated products.
Finally, these products must be produced with high quality at the lowest possible cost. (p.
3)
What are the Implications?
The agency theory literature provides us with one of the reasons that corporate managers in the West
focus on the short-run; namely, basing executives' bonuses on accounting income. Some evidence is
beginning to accumulate in that direction. According to the statistics compiled by the Conference Board
more companies are adding bonus plans to their list of compensations. And, some annual reports such
as that of Exxon, publish a brief on the bonus plan including the cash-bonus that is based on income. It
would be a mistake, however, to claim that the Japanese don't do that. The comparative data published
by GM in 1981 indicate that $2.60, or about 20 percent, of the hourly wages of auto workers in Japan
consist of some type of profit sharing. For GM, the hourly wage is about 60 percent higher than Japan
and none of it is directly based on profits. It is even more interesting to note the practice of Mitsubishi
Trust and Bank Corporation. An item at the bottom of the income statement in the 1981 Annual Report
reads: "Bonus to Directors and Auditors." The bonus is about 0.6 percent of net income. What all this
means is that basing incentives on profits is not necessarily a bad idea. The real problem is the type of
motivation those bonuses generate. The motivation is likely to be different for executives who are
locked in their positions, as compared to others who can change affiliation on a moment's notice.
Two other variables operate on affecting the type of motivation: the power of banks and the role of
equity markets. Banks in the U.S. are heavily constrained by all sorts of regulation, while banks in
Japan have a strong hand in controlling their corporate clients, investing in their stocks and bonds and
essentially have facilitated financing industrialization in an effective manner. Similarly, participants in
equity markets are composed differently in Japan; the majority of shareholders are banks, other
corporations and financial institutions. Rumors and short-run performance tend to be much less
influential on the trading of those shareholders. Western capital markets, on the other hand, thrive on all
sorts of information, including the variance in profits from quarter to quarter, a practice that does not
exist in Japan.
Given these organizational considerations, the focus on short-term profits will continue with us in the
West. Accountants have been entrusted by society with the important function of income determination.
As accountants, we must not engage in activities which facilitate the dysfunctional use of accounting to
serve that end. In my opinion, though of recent origin, three issues ought to be alarming: (1) adopting
"relevance" as the primary criterion for financial reporting; (2) relegating the measurement of
performance to a lower level in the hierarchy of objectives, and (3) the absence of a theory to determine
what is relevant (a point that was also made by Solomons (1981). These issues are likely to entice the
managers to seek changes in accounting policies only to serve their objective of reporting "good" short
term profits. This problem gives "relevance" a varying interpretation that leads managers to pressure
accounting policy makers to alter accounting policies and principles in a manner that is not necessarily
consistent with the responsibility entrusted to them by society-income determination. The pressures to
which the FASB was subjected to change Statement No. 8 and to rescind Statement No. 19 is
illustrative of the problem. Accounting standards that affect reported income adversely in magnitude or
volatility are fought. The history of accounting for investment tax credit with the APB is another
example.
Furthermore, permitting managers a wide latitude in selecting accounting principles and methods and in
altering them at will provides another vehicle. Changes in the method of depreciation and in the
estimated productive lives of fixed assets are common examples nowadays. Companies change
accounting principles that would "help" short-term profits. There is no good reason why income
determination was suddenly made better with these changes in accounting principles and methods.
Finally, the failure of financial reporting to reveal the impact of technological changes on corporate
wealth and income shelters vital information from users. With current reporting practices, it is
impossible to evaluate the quality of managerial decisions to abandon or keep old technology.
These problems are vitally important in accounting and need to be studied. In particular, I propose that:
1. Policy makers in accounting must reconsider the criterion of "relevance" in view of
their role in society which is "income-measurement and determination;"
2. Corporate executives may not be allowed to pressure accounting policy makers to
change policies only to help short term profits;
3. The wide latitude given to corporate executives in selecting and changing accounting
principles and methods must be reconsidered; and
4. Current cost reporting (Statement No. 33) is an inadequate response to the need to
reflect technological changes and impact of technology on the financial health of the
company. The Statement needs to be completely overhauled to achieve that
objective.
*I would like to express my appreciation to Susanna Chan for her library research assistance.
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